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1.   Introduction 
The recent rise in oil and other commodity prices has called into question the decision made 
by the Bank of Thailand in 2000 to choose a measure based on the CPI excluding fresh food 
and energy (“core inflation”) as the inflation target. Between the first quarter of 2004 and the 
third quarter of 2008, CPI inflation (“headline inflation”) averaged 4.0%, whereas the average 
core inflation registered 1.5%. During that period core inflation had been consistently lower 
than headline inflation in every quarter. Among the several questions raised by policymakers, 
the most crucial one is: given such a divergence, is core inflation still pertinent to the conduct 
of monetary policy as the target measure? Other relevant questions have included: why did 
the central bank choose core inflation in the first place? and what does theory say?  
This paper offers a justification for and assurance of the efficiency of a monetary policy 
design that is based on using core inflation as the policy target. Illustrated in a framework 
where the microeconomic foundation with rigidities of various types is the central feature, the 
first part of the paper starts with an important reminder of the reason why central banks need 
to focus on inflation as their primary objective. Instability of the general price level leads to 
undesired variation in the relative prices of goods, and, given the presence of price rigidity, 
allows only some subset of prices to adjust freely. These relative price distortions lead to 
inefficient resource allocation. 
Once the mandate of price stability is established, the next questions are: which measure(s) 
of inflation, according to theory, is/are most relevant to the conduct of monetary policy? 
Should the monetary authority stabilise the general price level or a narrower price index? In 
addition to prices of goods and services that are consumed by households, should other 
prices such as wages or asset prices be taken into consideration? 
While the literature broadly suggests that stabilising a target index that places more weight 
on the stickier prices is a better policy, it has mostly come to a conclusion that the monetary 
authority should be mindful of developments in a broad variety of prices. For example, if, in 
addition to prices, wages are not free to adjust, then price stabilisation may not be a good 
approximation of the optimal policy, and in this case monetary policy may need to stabilise 
wage inflation as well as price inflation. Another example occurs in the open economy 
context in which the monetary authority must decide between stabilising headline inflation or 
a narrower measure that is restricted to domestic inflation. Domestic prices are intrinsically 
stickier than the overall price level, as exchange rate fluctuations naturally cause import 
prices and hence the general price level to be more volatile. Here, the key factor in deciding 
whether domestic price stabilisation is optimal depends on the assumption of exchange rate 
pass-through. If the pass-through is full and immediate, then optimal policy requires that 
domestic inflation be fully stabilised. However, if the pass-through is imperfect, then strictly 
stabilising domestic inflation is suboptimal. In this case the general price level cannot be 
adjusted flexibly, rendering price-setters to look into the future movements in the overall price 
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level and not just the domestic price level when making their decision. In essence, while 
theory has established that optimal monetary policy from a welfare-theoretic analysis is one 
that targets the rate of changes in sticky prices, that conclusion also depends on other 
features of the economy such as the degree of wage rigidity and exchange rate pass-
through. As a result, while the choice of the policy target in the case of Thailand comes down 
to core inflation, the central bank needs to take into consideration developments in various 
aspects of the economy, especially when core inflation and headline inflation deviate from 
each other for an extended period. 
In its implementation of the inflation targeting framework, the Bank of Thailand also looks at 
several indicators that help to gauge underlying price pressures as accurately as possible. 
The first type of indicators is designed to separate noise from underlying inflation signals 
based on different methodologies. Indicators based on smoothing and/or reweighting the 
general price level time series have proved especially useful, not only during the previous 
episodes of rising oil prices, but also at the present time given unintended price distortions 
caused by a heightened extent of government price controls. Moreover, with the government 
reducing the prices of certain public utilities temporarily (or setting them to zero in certain 
instances) to help low-income households, the central bank needs to be alert in adapting the 
existing inflation indicators and in looking for new ones so as to accurately measure 
underlying price pressures. The second type of inflation indicators are those from the labour 
market such as movements in wages and unit labour costs as well as wage setting 
behaviour. Third, as inflation expectations are central to inflation dynamics and given that 
anchoring inflation expectations is one of the most important objectives of monetary policy, 
indicators of inflation expectations – for example, those obtained from surveys and financial 
markets – play an important role in the formulation of monetary policy. All three types of 
indicators are closely monitored by the Bank of Thailand. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly sets the stage by emphasising 
the importance of price stability using the recent ideas that are grounded in the New 
Keynesian framework or the so-called “new consensus in macroeconomics.” Once price 
stability is firmly established as the central bank mandate, section 3 subsequently focuses on 
the appropriate measure of inflation that needs to be stabilised in theory. Section 4 then 
looks at various indicators of underlying inflation and measures of inflation expectations that 
are used in practice. Section 5 explores an outstanding issue in the analysis of inflation in 
Thailand, namely, price controls and their implications for the conduct of monetary policy. 
Section 6 concludes. The appendix gives details on the construction of the consumer price 
index in Thailand.  
2.   The importance of price stability 
Price stability, generally considered to be the primary objective of monetary authorities, is 
broadly characterised as an environment in which inflation is “so low and stable over time 
that it does not materially enter into the decisions of households and firms” (Greenspan 
(2002)). Indeed, as noted by Woodford (2003), a notable feature of recent developments in 
monetary theory and policy is the increased emphasis given to maintaining a low and stable 
rate of inflation. The motivation of recent theoretical work comes from the inability of some 
input suppliers (especially households that supply labour) as well as producers of goods and 
services to adjust wages and prices for a period of time in response to various shocks that 
prevent the economy from producing efficiently in the short run. 
From a public policy point of view, there are at least two approaches to solving this 
inefficiency. One is to remove structural inflexibility in wages and prices through, for example, 
an elimination of protracted wage-price contracts. This approach is perhaps not always 
possible in the real world. The other is to create an environment for firms in which they are BIS Papers No 49  349
 
 
content with existing prices, even though they cannot change their prices due to the 
structural constraints. This is what monetary policy aims to achieve. This approach, now 
more or less a consensus, posits that inflation has a deadweight loss – that is, it causes 
inefficient allocation and utilisation of resources through relative price distortion. The loss 
arises when individual prices, which signal supply and demand by the household and 
business sectors, cannot adjust freely and instantaneously while the general price level 
changes. Consequently, the profitability of producing goods and services no longer reflects 
the relative social costs of producing them, which in turn yields a suboptimal allocation of 
resources
i (see endnotes for technical details). Under this view, the central bank should use 
monetary policy to simulate a flexible-price environment by generating and committing to 
price stabilisation.
ii 
3.   Which measure of inflation to stabilise in theory? 
3.1.   Stabilising movements in sticky prices  
Given the constraint on price adjustments and the consequent relative price distortions 
caused by inflation, recent research shows, in a simplified setting abstracting from such 
frictions as the downward nominal wage rigidity or the zero lower bound on nominal interest 
rates, that monetary policy should aim to engineer zero inflation. In reality, with imperfect 
inflation measurement and other rigidities and constraints, monetary policy should aim to 
obtain a low and stable (ie near zero) inflation trend. In particular, it should aim to stabilise 
sticky prices – rather than a broader price index that puts much weight on prices that already 
can adjust frequently. 
An analytical framework can be constructed such that prices in one sector are more rigid 
than those in another; within this framework, it can be shown that society benefits more if 
monetary authorities place more emphasis on stabilising inflation in the sticky-price sector. 
To be precise, the welfare loss function puts a higher weight on variations in the sticky-price 
sector relative to those in the flexible price counterpart.
iii In a simplified setting of Aoki (2001), 
imperfection in price adjustments that is the root cause of relative price distortions is located 
in the sticky-price sector only and not in the flexible price sector. In such an environment, 
complete stabilisation of an aggregate price index is not optimal; instead, stabilisation of 
inflation in the sticky-price sector is a better policy.
3 In a related setting, Benigno (2004) 
considers a case of a monetary union consisting of two countries, which can be interpreted 
as a two-sector closed economy with completely segmented labour markets, to show that a 
policy that is nearly optimal is characterised by targeting an inflation index that puts a higher 
weight on inflation in the region with a higher degree of nominal rigidity. 
In this simplified framework, theory suggests that optimal monetary policy should focus on 
stabilising a measure of sticky prices, which is interpreted as core inflation. Central banks 
should not lose sight of other developments in the economy, however, especially those that 
have the potential to affect the public’s formation of expectations. For instance, if the rate of 
change in the price of a weighty item excluded from the CPI measure deviates from its trend 
over an extended period of time, perhaps on account of a large persistent shock, then overall 
inflation can tend away from the central bank’s core measure and core inflation would appear 
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an inadequate measure of underlying inflation. According to Mishkin (2008a), “[A] prolonged 
divergence between core and headline measures of inflation could complicate central bank 
communications with the public, because core inflation would require some adjustment 
before it would provide a clear gauge of underlying inflation.” During those episodes, in the 
interest of expectation management, which is crucial to a central bank’s inflation trend 
anchoring, central banks have to work hard to ensure effective communication with the public 
about the underlying price pressures in the economy to avoid the so-called second-round 
effects that are prone to occur during such episodes.  
Similar questions regarding the choice of stabilising a narrow or broad price index also arise 
in the open economy context. In an open economy, movements in foreign import prices and 
exchange rates result in a difference between domestic inflation and overall price inflation. 
Gali and Monacelli (2005) use the Phillips curve to show that the dynamics of domestic 
inflation in their open-economy model can still be described by an equation analogous to that 
associated with a closed economy. However, the determinants of the real marginal cost, in 
addition to domestic output and technology, are also foreign output and the terms of trade, as 
changes in foreign demand affects domestic resource utilisation while changes in the terms 
of trade affect the relative price of foreign goods with respect to domestic goods. As the 
welfare loss function in this setting depends on variations in domestic inflation and not overall 
inflation – imperfection in price adjustments is exclusively located in the domestic sector and 
not in the foreign counterpart – optimal policy requires that domestic inflation be fully 
stabilised, while allowing headline inflation, and implicitly the nominal exchange rate, to 
adjust as needed in order to reproduce the response of the terms of trade that would be 
obtained under flexible prices.
iv In short, this finding in the open-economy context has a 
fundamental idea that is consistent with targeting the inflation rate of the sector that has more 
nominal inertia, and also resonates with the economic interdependency and increased 
globalisation of late. Fluctuations in oil prices – as reflected in the erstwhile upswing caused 
by surging demand from a large and rapidly growing Asian economy, or in the recent 
collapse in oil prices caused by an ongoing slowdown in activity in many foreign economies, 
especially the world’s largest one – result in the overall price level of any small open 
economy possibly not accurately reflecting underlying price pressures. In such 
circumstances the monetary authority should look through headline inflation and focus 
instead on domestic inflation.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Gali and Monacelli abstract from several channels 
that potentially render a strict domestic inflation targeting policy suboptimal. For example, in 
the case where foreign commodity prices have a distinct trend or the exchange rate pass-
through is not immediate and full, both the domestic price and the general price level are 
rigid – the latter now inherits inertia from the external economy in addition to the domestic 
price that is intrinsically inflexible. In this case, responding to movements in the general price 
level may be appropriate. In all, no matter what assumptions are made regarding the degree 
or speed of foreign inflation pass-through, monetary policy should focus on a measure of 
inflation that reflects nominal rigidities that give rise to inefficiency in resource allocation.  
3.2.   Stabilising movements in other prices? 
Wages. In the presence of sticky prices and sticky wages, various theoretical works such as 
Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), Giannoni and Woodford (2003), and Woodford (2003) 
have shown policies that focus exclusively on stabilising price inflation to be suboptimal. 
Intuitively, in addition to variations in the output gap and price inflation, fluctuations in wage 
inflation, subject to the sluggish response of nominal wage, bring about relative wage 
distortions that result in an inefficient allocation of labour and a consequent welfare loss. As a 
result, given wage rigidities, strict targeting of price inflation is no longer optimal, and theory 
suggests that central banks should target a weighted average of price and wage inflation, 
with the weights proportional to the degree of rigidity.
v Nevertheless, problems in the 
measurement of labour costs may partly explain a small role of wages, relative to prices, in BIS Papers No 49  351
 
 
many central banks’ price stability objective. Bernanke (2008) observes that in the United 
States, compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector, a commonly used measure of 
labour cost, “displays substantial volatility from quarter to quarter and year to year, is often 
revised significantly, and includes compensation that is largely unrelated to marginal costs.” 
Several problems can also be found in the Thai wage data. For example, wages in the public 
sector turn out to be higher than those in the private sector. Hence, although theory suggests 
wage inflation should be explicitly included in their target, data availability and data quality – 
let alone confidence in various functional forms and accuracy of calibrated/estimated 
structural parameters – possibly prevent central banks from having done so in practice. 
Although this leaves out wage inflation as a primary target of central banks, we regularly 
monitor various measures of labour market pressures so as to gauge as accurately as 
possible the overall price pressures in the economy. 
Asset prices. Although a bursting asset price bubble potentially has deleterious effects on 
the economy, several arguments have been put forward against an explicit inclusion of asset 
price inflation in monetary policy rules. First, a central bank needs to identify the existence of 
a “bubble” – whether asset prices have moved away from their equilibrium level to such an 
extent that asset price fluctuations affect output and inflation. Identification is not an easy 
task. Furthermore, as Mishkin (2008b) notes, attempts to influence asset prices when the 
central bank is uncertain about the presence or extent of a bubble can interfere with the role 
of asset prices in allocating resources. Second, once a bubble is large enough to be 
identified reliably, argues Bean (2007), it is perhaps especially difficult for the central bank to 
predict the timing and strength of monetary policy transmission from interest rate changes to 
asset price inflation compared to the effects of the interest rate on CPI inflation. As bubbles 
are departures from normal behaviour, impacts of the usual tool of monetary policy – that is, 
the setting of overnight interest rates – are not exactly clear and to a certain extent can be 
“blunt.” Instead of including asset price inflation as a monetary policy target, Goodhart (2007) 
suggests using another instrument in response to asset price fluctuations, namely, 
countercyclical prudential regulations that are restrictive during an episode of asset price 
bubbles and stimulatory during an episode of asset price downturns. 
4.   Indicators of underlying inflation and measures of inflation 
expectations 
4.1.   CPI as a proxy for the general price level 
Given that households and firms in Thailand appear to use CPI inflation, which is transparent 
and well understood by the public, to index wages, salaries, pensions and long-term 
contracts, and that data on CPI inflation are timely, published regularly, and not subject to 
revision, the Bank of Thailand considers CPI inflation as a reliable measure of the change in 
the general price level, and uses it to form a basis for calculation of underlying inflation, 
which ideally approximates movements of changes in sticky prices in the economy. The 
other available proxy for the general price level is the GDP deflator (in Thailand the price 
deflator for personal consumption expenditure is not available). However, the GDP deflator is 
released only on a quarterly basis, with the difference between inflation based on the CPI 
and the GDP deflator being relatively minor, except during the period in which the economy 
experiences large terms-of-trade shocks such as the 1997 currency crisis, as shown in 




































































Sources: Ministry of Commerce and the National Economic and Social 
Development Board. 
4.2.   Official target: core inflation based on fixed-item exclusion 
In calculating underlying inflation, the Bank of Thailand has used the fixed-item exclusion 
approach – that is, excluding the prices of fresh food and energy from the CPI. The rationale 
behind the exclusion is that these prices are the most volatile relative to other prices in the 
CPI, as illustrated in figure 2. 
Figure 2 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce. 
Core CPI inflation has been a monetary policy target in Thailand since the adoption of the 
inflation targeting framework in May 2000. There have been criticisms of whether core 
inflation is an appropriate target, particularly in the past few years during which headline 
inflation and core inflation drifted apart given continuous rises in food and energy prices; see 
Khemangkorn et al (2008) for details. Consequently, the Bank of Thailand has not placed its 
sole emphasis on developments in core inflation but instead on a variety of underlying 
inflation indicators. BIS Papers No 49  353
 
 
4.3.   Measures of underlying inflation other than core inflation 
4.3.1.  Measures based on price inflation 
According to Roberts (2005), there are two broad approaches to constructing measures of 
underlying inflation. The first is to estimate underlying inflation by using a theoretical model 
with economic restrictions (eg Quah and Vahey (1995)). The second is based on statistical 
methods such as reweighting or smoothing as described below. 
 
Table 1 
Underlying inflation indicators 
  No reweighting  
across items 
Reweighting across items 
No smoothing across time  – CPI  – Fixed-item  exclusion  (core  CPI)
– Trimmed  mean 
Smoothing across time  –  Simple averaging; moving 
averaging 
– Exponential  smoothing 
–  Unobserved component model 
 
Table 1, adapted from Brischetto and Richards (2007), shows underlying inflation indicators 
currently monitored by the Bank of Thailand. As mentioned above, the CPI forms the basis 
for the calculation of underlying inflation. Smoothing the changes in the CPI across time 
while leaving the weights given to the price of each CPI component unchanged gives, for 
instance, simple averaging, moving averaging, and exponential smoothing. Reweighting the 
CPI components permanently or period by period gives core CPI inflation or trimmed mean 
inflation. One can also both reweight each CPI component and smooth the resulting trend 
across time to obtain a measure of underlying inflation using an unobserved component 
model. Details of the construction, advantages and disadvantages of these methodologies 
are given in Khemangkorn and Tanboon (2007) and Sutthasri (2008), and are summarised 
as follows. 
Fixed-item exclusion measure.  This approach gives zero weights to items in the CPI 
basket whose prices are considered most volatile – usually unprocessed foods and energy. 
Sometimes the excluded items are in the fresh food category only. Occasionally, not only 
food and energy but also mortgage interest payments are left out. A caution is in order. This 
approach relies on an assumption that prices of the excluded items are the most volatile in 
every period. If this assumption does not hold at any time, such an indicator may fail 
accurately to capture underlying inflation, especially when price movements of the excluded 
items exhibit a distinct trend following persistent demand shocks, thereby leading to bias 
over the long run. 
Trimmed mean inflation. To ensure that prices of the excluded CPI components are indeed 
the most volatile in each period, this approach constructs a weighted average based on the 
ranked distribution of price changes of all CPI components. This is in contrast to the fixed-
item exclusion above because the present methodology does not permanently exclude the 
same items in every period. Trimming can be symmetric or asymmetric depending on the 
distribution of price movements. However, one problem with the trimmed mean inflation 
measure involves communication with the public because the excluded items vary over time. 
In addition, it is subject to revision, especially when the index is constructed on the month-
on-month basis, as new data may alter the seasonal factors and consequently the rate of 
change in the price of each CPI component. 354  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
Kalman-smoothed inflation measure. Given that underlying inflation is unobserved, one 
way to estimate it is to use the unobserved component model with the Kalman filter. This 
methodology is based on Bryan, Cecchetti and Sullivan (2002), whereby movements in the 
price of each CPI component depend on changes in the common trend and an idiosyncratic 
shock specific to that CPI component. An advantage of this methodology is that it accords 
policymakers the judgment to alter the signal parameters when the economic environment 
changes. However, the problem of this leeway is the difficulty in communicating with the 
public and the possibility of revision following changes in the signal parameters. 
Results for Thailand 
Figure 3, which shows indicators of underlying inflation constructed by Sutthasri (2008) 
based on the concepts outlined above, illustrates the necessity of having inflation measures 
other than a single core inflation indicator. One policy challenge drawn from the Thai 
experience is that core inflation possibly reflects pressures in economic activities only 
partially during certain episodes. 
In particular, during 2003−05, just after the Thai economy came out of the crisis, there were 
greater inflationary risks as a result of higher economic growth, credit expansion, a tightening 
labour market – not to mention a continued rise in oil prices. Meanwhile, the trend in core 
inflation at the time did not reflect any inflationary pressures. This was due to a decline in 
rent, which constitutes 21% of the core CPI basket and 16% of the CPI basket. 
Consequently, a larger negative contribution of rent weighed down on core inflation to a level 
close to zero, which is the lower bound of the target range. In this case, the potential failure 
of core inflation accurately to gauge pressures in the economy necessitates the Monetary 
Policy Committee to look for alternative indicators of underlying price pressures with more 
flexibility to capture the changing dynamics of the economy. By either fully or partially 
excluding rent from overall inflation, measures of underlying inflation such as a trimmed 
mean are more appropriate for inflation analysis. 
Another instance in which measures of underlying inflation other than core inflation serve as 
a more accurate inflation gauge is when prices of permanently excluded items in the core 
CPI basket exhibit a distinct trend. For instance, between January 2004 and July 2008, the 
gap between CPI inflation and core inflation was persistently large. Conversely, the 
counterparts for the indicators based on trimming or filtering were smaller, as these 
indicators did not miss an upward inflation trend in the excluded items – arguably resulting 
from demand pressures rather than supply shocks – that is left out in the calculation of core 
inflation. Consequently, by looking at core inflation alone, we may fail accurately to detect 
inflationary pressures. 
The problem with exclusively focusing on core inflation has also become more apparent, 
especially recently, when there are extreme price distortions caused by the ongoing 
government measures that involve price controls and extensive subsidies in response to 
rapid increases in the general costs of living and, most recently, to a subsequent slowdown 
in economic activity (more on the implication of price controls for the conduct of monetary 































Source: Bank of Thailand. 
4.3.2.   Measures based on wage inflation 
Wages have the potential to play a crucial role in inflation dynamics. Given that the key 
variable that drives inflation dynamics in the New Keynesian Phillips curve is real marginal 
cost, which in turn is primarily driven by real wage, labour markets provide vital information 
about the future path of inflation. Data in Thailand are less than perfect, unfortunately, given 
that the large informal sector within the country and the continuous inflow of (legal and 
illegal) migrant workers from neighbouring countries render the measurement of labour 
market pressures especially difficult. Nevertheless, the Bank of Thailand attempts to extract 
signals from labour market data and regularly monitors the following measures. 
Wage and hourly compensation. Hourly compensation is defined as all payments made 
directly to workers that include wages, salaries, overtime premiums, bonuses and employee 
benefits. (For ease of exposition, in what follows we use the term “wage” more broadly to 
mean hourly compensation). As shown in figure 4, on average wage inflation is higher than 
CPI inflation in almost every year, except during 1998−99 owing to the financial crisis and 
devaluation of the baht. CPI inflation and wage inflation in Thailand appear to converge in the 
past 15 years, with the correlation coefficient over 1994−2008 being equal to 0.44. It should 
be noted that the National Statistical Office modified survey questions in 2001, which means 
that data before and after 2001 are not on the same compilation basis. Consequently we 
calculate correlation between CPI inflation and wage inflation over 2002−08 and find the 
coefficient to be 0.64. A positive correlation means that in a period of rising inflation, wage 
inflation increases as well. In order to gauge pressures in the labour market and their 
subsequent effects on prices meaningfully, we need to examine whether the higher growth in 
real wage net of changes in productivity is increasing. Under that circumstance firms are 
bearing an increase in costs that is not due to an increase in productivity, and that makes 
firms likely to pass on the higher costs to consumers. Here, the notion of unit labour costs is 
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Remark: The term “wage” is used more broadly to refer to hourly 
compensation. 
Sources: Ministry of Commerce; National Statistical Office; authors’ 
calculation. 
Unit labour costs. Computed as wage divided by output per hour, the (nominal) unit labour 
cost is a widely known indicator of labour market pressures. Intuitively, given that costs 
associated with labour represent a majority of input costs, rising wages will eventually affect 
prices.
4 A related notion, the real unit labour cost, which is computed as real wage divided by 
output per hour, is a potentially useful measure of inflation because it provides a direct 
comparison between real wage and labour productivity: if real wage rises faster than labour 
productivity, firms are worse off and need to raise prices if they can. Empirical results in 
Woodford (2001) and Sbordone (2002) suggest that real unit labour cost, which proxies real 
marginal cost, is the driving variable in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (and is a better 
explanatory variable for inflation relative to the output gap). This structural relationship forms 
a basis for our analysis of inflation. The top panel of figure 5 shows the components of the 
real unit labour cost, namely, real wage and labour productivity. The bottom panel attempts 
to portray the relationship between inflation and the real unit labour cost (the latter is shown 
in terms of percentage deviation from trend). A quick calculation shows correlation between 
the two variables to be 0.08. We also find that the real unit labour cost leads inflation in two 
quarters, with a correlation coefficient of around 0.35. 
What we have learned from looking at pressures in the labour market is that there appears to 
be a very small degree of pass-through of labour market pressures to prices. That the degree 
of pass-through is not full and immediate is perhaps not surprising given that there are 
several factors that can affect firms’ pricing powers, such as economic conditions, the degree 
of competitiveness in both domestic and foreign markets, and, especially in the case of 
Thailand, the extent of price controls by the authorities (more on this on section 5). For 
instance, over 2004−05 when the real unit labour cost was rising as real wage grew faster 
than labour productivity, with the economy expanding, firms could pass on the higher costs to 
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prices, and here we witnessed rising inflation over this period. In contrast, during 2008 when 
the real unit labour cost was rising again as productivity grew at a negative rate in the fourth 
quarter following a significant slowdown in the world economy, firms were unlikely to raise 
their prices even though the real unit labour cost was on the rise, but instead cut employment 
in order to reduce labour costs. Here we see that there are other factors at play that can 
affect the pass-through of labour market pressures onto prices, and simply looking at wages 
will not be enough.  
Figure 5 
Wage, productivity, unit labour cost and inflation 
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Sources: National Economic and Social Development Board; National 
Statistics Office; authors’ calculation. 
Minimum wage. Another important indicator of labour market pressures is minimum wage. 
Although only 7% of the labour force actually earn the minimum wage, the rest earn wages 
that move in line with movements of the minimum wage to some extent. The Central Wage 
Committee is a tripartite minimum-wage setting panel consisting of employers, employees 
and state authorities (including a representative from the central bank). The collective 
bargaining process reveals an important feature of the wage-setting process in Thailand that 
is rather backward looking: the minimum wage is generally adjusted only once a year and is 
indexed to the previous year’s inflation rate. Even in the periods of high inflation such as 
during 1994−96 and 2008, wage setting is still conducted in a backward-looking manner 
(although resetting can occur during the year). In terms of the pricing power of labour, wage 
setters in Thailand do not have much bargaining power, in part because of the presence of 
(illegal) foreign labour and weak labour unions. Regulation by the authority features 
prominently in Thailand to the extent that only part of requested increase in wages is granted 
by the tripartite committee.  
4.4.   Measuring and assessing inflation expectations  
Inflation expectations of households and firms are a key factor in determining the actual 
behaviour of inflation. As inflation results from the aggregate consequences of purposeful 
price-setting decisions by forward-looking firms, today’s inflation depends critically on current 
marginal cost and particularly on expected future inflation. Given that the traditional Phillips 358  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
curve explains only a modest part of inflation fluctuations, policymakers have focused on 
measuring and assessing inflation expectations.
5 
In Thailand, we primarily rely on two sources in assessing inflation expectations, namely, 
surveys of businesses, and information gathered from financial markets. With regard to 
survey-based measures of expectations, there are two important points are. First, 
respondents appear to give estimates based on recent and past inflation instead of future 
inflation; such behaviour in effect gives rise to expectations that are formed in a rather 
backward-looking manner. Second, the survey previously asked respondents about the 
range in which year-ahead inflation was expected to lie so as to facilitate responses. Given 
an important drawback that the only information we gain from the survey is how the 
proportions of firms with different inflation projections change (see figure 6), we have recently 
modified survey questions to elicit specific point estimates and hope to obtain a more 
accurate measure of inflation expectations. 
With regard to measures of inflation expectations based on information from the financial 
markets, we look at movements of implied forward interest rates as indicators of changes in 
financial market expectations of future inflation. We estimate the term structure of interest 
rates using government bond yields; the estimated term structure allows us to extract the 
implied forward rates at various points in the future. By assuming in the following equation 
t
e
t t t r i           
that real interest rates are stable (Δrt = 0) and that changes in the risk premium are relatively 
small (Δηt = 0) in the long end, changes in the implied forward curve in the long end can be 
taken to approximate changes in inflation expectations (Δit = Δt
e). 
How the above inflation expectations indicators are used in the conduct of monetary policy 
can be illustrated as follows. During the first half of 2008 when commodity prices were on the 
rise, figures 6 and 7 show that, although the survey-based one-year-ahead inflation 
expectations are found to be increased in line with inflation at that time, the long-term 
inflation expectations from the implied forward curve remain mostly unchanged.  
                                                  
5   Inflation expectations also have the potential to affect inflation persistence. Once instance is during 1971−76, 
when the increase in inflation in Thailand was due to temporary supply shocks. However, inflation continued to 
be elevated for several subsequent years over 1977−80. Khemangkorn et al (2008) find that such a persistent 
effect was in part explained by a monetary policy that was too accommodating at the time, owing to the 
pegged exchange rate regime that obliged domestic monetary policy to follow the loose monetary policy 
stance of the United States. Their finding, based on a Taylor-type rule, shows that inflation persistence tends 














































Remark: Different shades denote different ranges of inflation 
expectations. 
Source: Bank of Thailand. 
Figure 7 
Market-implied inflation expectations 
 
Source: Calculation by Bank of Thailand staff. 
5.   An outstanding issue in Thailand: price regulation  
In addition to closely monitoring the prices of over 200 items in both the consumer and 
producer baskets since 2005, with the weights of the regulated items in CPI and core CPI 
baskets at around one third, the Thai government subsequently introduced a new package of 
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measures essentially entail free or reduced prices in household use of tap water, electricity 
and public transport if consumed within certain limits, with the government taking up the 
shortfall in revenues. While the weights of these utilities in the CPI and the core CPI baskets 
– approximately 9% and 2%, respectively – may look like a small portion in the baskets, but 
when those prices are reduced by 36−100%, the impacts of these government measures can 
be significant, with the CPI and the core CPI falling immediately by 3.4 and 1.7 percentage 
points in August 2008 on a year-on-year basis. 
An important implication for the conduct of monetary policy of these government measures is 
that the monetary authority needs to look for appropriate measures of underlying inflationary 
pressures. The above government intervention inevitably obscures measures of broad 
inflationary pressures and confounds seasonal patterns in various prices – the latter in effect 
distorts the construction of underlying inflation indicators. The Bank of Thailand consequently 
excludes the effects of these regulated prices and finds that, in the absence of government 
measures, CPI and core CPI inflation are significantly higher as shown in figure 8. At the 
same time, the trimmed mean and Kalman-filtered inflation measures appear to provide a 
more accurate picture of underlying inflationary pressures, which is not distorted by artificial 
reduction in prices controlled by the authority. 
Figure 8 







Jan07 Jul Jan08 Jul








Jan07 Jul Jan08 Jul













Sources: Ministry of Commerce; Bank of Thailand; authors’ calculation. 
6.   Conclusions 
In the New Keynesian framework, monetary policy has a unique role in rectifying resource 
misallocation caused by price rigidity. Given that firms cannot adjust their prices as often as 
they wish, the average markup will vary over time in response to shocks and can thus be 
different from the optimal markup firms would want to charge if prices were flexible. 
Consequently, given the predetermined prices, the goal of monetary policy is to stabilise the 
current value and the future path of marginal cost at a level consistent with firms’ optimal 
markup. If that policy is credible, no firm will have an incentive to change their prices 
regardless of whether they have the opportunity to do so, because they are effectively 
charging their optimal markup now, thanks to monetary policy, and will continue to do so BIS Papers No 49  361
 
 
indefinitely. As a result, the aggregate price level is fully stabilised. Price stability is thus 
closely associated with optimality at the micro level and the attainment of the efficient 
allocation. 
In theory, with regard to the appropriate inflation stabilisation policy – stabilising core inflation 
versus headline inflation, domestic inflation versus overall inflation, price inflation versus 
wage inflation – theory broadly suggests that optimal monetary policy should stabilise 
inflation in the sticky-price sector, because this is where the restriction of price adjustments 
that is the source of allocatory inefficiency lies. Consequently, much of the literature points to 
stabilising core inflation in the closed economy, stabilising domestic inflation in the open 
economy, and stabilising a combination of price and wage inflation if there are nominal 
rigidities in both goods and labour markets. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that 
these theoretical results depend on the model setups and the associated assumptions. For 
instance, in the open-economy context, if full and immediate exchange rate pass-through is 
assumed, stabilising domestic inflation is a better policy. When this assumption is relaxed so 
that import prices become sticky, there are now inefficiencies in the markets for imported 
goods as well as domestic goods. In this environment monetary policy should stabilise prices 
in both markets by targeting overall inflation. In the end, regardless of the setup and model 
assumptions, the gist of optimal policy is that the monetary authority should stabilise the 
inflation measure corresponding to where price rigidity is located. 
In practice, once the monetary authority chooses a preferred gauge on inflation, which 
reflects as far as possible the persistent component of inflation, as policy target to anchor 
expectations, it also considers a variety of inflation measures as supplementary indicators of 
price pressures. As is well known, there is no single indicator that corresponds perfectly to 
what the central bank considers to be inflation in the sticky-price sector(s) according to 
theory. The Bank of Thailand recognises the limitations of core inflation. Furthermore, even 
though we have been monitoring a number of underlying inflation indicators, there are 
several factors that have the potential to influence inflation dynamics, and they are 
consequently under our careful observation. We also keep a close watch on changes in 
equity and bond prices as well as real estate prices – because such asset prices potentially 
provide useful information about the inflation outlook – and also on the expansion in credits 
as this in turn facilitates increases in asset prices. In summary, while our evaluation of 
inflation pressures primarily focuses on developments of a measure that we consider to best 
reflect underlying price pressures on average, we are aware of and keep ourselves alert to a 
variety of prices and costs that directly or indirectly indicate pressures in the economy, to 




Consumer price index in Thailand 
Methodology. The consumer price index (CPI) and the core consumer price index (core 
CPI) are published by the Bureau of Trade and Economic Indices of the Ministry of 
Commerce on a monthly basis, and are usually released on the first working day of the 
following month. The core CPI is defined as the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy 
prices. 
The Bureau constructs the CPI as a fixed-weight average of prices of individual goods and 
services using a Laspeyres formula. In general, the CPI measures the change in the price of 
goods and services purchased by representative households in some base period. The base 
period is generally updated every four years. Inflation figures released since January 2004 
are based on consumption patterns in 2002, with the weights used in the construction of the 
CPI obtained from the National Statistical Office based on a household expenditure survey. 
The new CPI series based on consumption patterns in 2006 will soon be released in the first 
half of 2009.  
Coverage. The CPI and the core CPI cover 374 and 266 items, respectively. CPI and core 
CPI components are shown in Table A below. 
 
Table A 
Disaggregated components in the CPI and the core CPI 
Weight 
Components 
CPI  Core CPI 
1. Food and beverages  36.06   
2. Apparel and footwear  3.40   
3. Housing and furnishing  23.86   
4. Medical and personal care  6.04   
5. Transport and communications  21.98   
6. Recreation and education  5.82   
7. Tobacco and alcoholic beverages  2.83   
Total 100.0  75.95 
 
The overall CPI basket can also be classified into three categories: unprocessed food, 
energy items, and core CPI with the weights of 15.00%, 9.05%, and 75.95% respectively. 
Unprocessed food consists of four subcategories: (1) rice, flour and cereal products; 
(2) meat, poultry and fish; (3) eggs and dairy products; and (4) fruit and vegetables. Energy 
consists of three subcategories: (1) fuel; (2) cooking gas; and (3) electricity. 
Caveats. As is well known, the CPI is arguably biased. One instance is substitution bias 
coming from the Laspeyres formula. The formula assumes that households must purchase 
the same basket of products as surveyed in the base period – which is not necessarily true 
when households substitute away from the higher-priced products. Another instance of bias 
in the CPI arises when new products enter the market, as they will not be incorporated into 
the CPI calculation until the CPI basket has been updated. This type of bias is known as new 
product bias. Other types of bias are outlet substitution bias and quality bias; see a classic BIS Papers No 49  363
 
 
study by Boskin et al (1996) for further details. The size of bias partly depends on how 
frequently the basket has been updated: the longer the time between the revisions of the 
basket, the more severe the bias. The consensus in international findings is that the size of 
bias is quite small, but most central banks, including the Bank of Thailand, are still interested 




i  One may wonder how exactly inflation affects a household’s welfare, given that the 
arguments of household utility functions generally are assumed to be the quantities 
of various goods and services, but not their prices. A second-order Taylor expansion 
of the household’s utility around a steady state with constant prices yields the 
household’s welfare loss, which is a function of variations in a measure of real 
activity (ie the output gap) and the cross-sectional variance of relative prices – the 
latter can be shown to increase with inflation. The welfare loss function can be 
written algebraically as 
   
  where the second equation uses the fact that price dispersion is directly related to 
inflation. Focusing on the inflation term, welfare loss is increasing in the elasticity 
substitution among different goods () and in the degree of price rigidity (which is 
inversely related to ). Intuitively, given price dispersions, the more easily goods can 
be substituted for each other, the stronger the degree of resource misallocation and 
the higher the welfare loss. Second, the more strongly prices change, the higher the 
degree of price dispersions, as prices fail to adjust in tandem, leading to a higher 
welfare loss. As a result, the desirability of minimising relative price distortions 
provides a key rationale for monetary policy to promote price stability by targeting 
inflation. 
ii Consider  a  structural environment in which firms find it costly to change prices. 
These firms normally have to stick with “pre-fixed” prices until they have an 
opportunity to adjust them. Consequently, the aggregate price level today will 
depend on last period’s aggregate price level and today’s new prices set by those 
firms that are allowed to change their prices. In other words, there is persistence in 
the aggregate price level, and this persistence comes from structural inability to 
change prices freely in response to shocks at any date and state. To maximise a 
stream of expected future profits, the “rigid-price” firms, when they can, decide on 
new prices, taking as givens the prices of all other goods, aggregate demand, and 
the real disturbances. 
  Consider now the world in which there is zero inflation on average. In this case, 
when these rigid-price firms actually get a chance to change their prices, it turns out 
that they will voluntarily maintain their prices at the average of existing prices. They 
do this only when they can operate in the consistent belief that, on average, other 
firms behave similarly by keeping their prices unchanged. In aggregate, then, the 
average of existing prices never changes and so the new “sticky” prices chosen will 
be the same prevailing prices, thereby keeping the general price level unchanged. In 
the absence of price dispersion, the relative prices among various goods and 
services are not distorted, and resources can be efficiently allocated even when 
certain prices cannot instantaneously change in response to shocks. 
iii  Aoki (2001) and Woodford (2003) use a two-sector dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model in which prices are fully flexible in one sector but sticky in the 
other to show that the period loss function depends on variations in (1) the rate of 
inflation in each sector individually; (2) the deviation of the output gap from its 
efficient level; and (3) the deviation of the relative price between the two sectors 
from its natural (ie efficient or flexible-price) counterpart: BIS Papers No 49  365
 
 
   
 where 
   
 Here  wj, the weight given to the inflation variation in sector j, is increasing in nj (the 
share of sector j in national income) but decreasing in κj (a smaller value of which 
indicates a higher degree of price rigidity). It can be shown that a policy that 
completely stabilises the price index for the sticky-price sector is optimal, because it 
achieves the same allocation of resources as would occur under price flexibility. 
However, such a policy does not completely stabilise the broader price index. This is 
because for the relative price, pRt, to track the natural counterpart while the sticky-
price index remains constant, there must be a variable inflation rate in the flexible-
price sector insofar as the natural relative price is a function solely of exogenous 
disturbances. 
iv  A second-order approximation to the welfare of the representative household in Gali 
and Monacelli (2005) yields a period welfare loss that is a function of the variances 
in the domestic output gap and inflation in the home country: 
   
  This welfare loss function is almost identical to the closed economy counterpart 
given in endnote 1, except that domestic inflation, not the overall inflation, being the 
relevant inflation variable. It should be noted that in the present model several 
parameters are assumed to take certain values (including the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion (σ), which is set to 1) so that a second-order approximation to welfare 
can easily be derived analytically. Furthermore, Gali and Monacelli also abstract 
from several channels that may potentially render a strict domestic inflation targeting 
policy suboptimal (eg imperfect pass-through).  
v  The mechanics underlying Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) can be described as 
follows. A second-order Taylor approximation to the household’s lifetime utility yields 
a welfare loss:  
   
  The presence of sticky wages implies an additional welfare loss that arises because 
of fluctuations in wage inflation. In the last term of the above expression the 
contribution of wage inflation volatility to welfare loss is increasing in the elasticity of 
output with respect to labour input (1), the elasticity of substitution among labour 
types (w), and the wage stickiness (which is inversely related to w). Given the 
above welfare loss function, for a certain parameterisation so that an analytical 
solution exists, the optimal policy is to target a weighted average of price and wage 
inflation defined as 
   
 where 
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